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Abstract
Technological and social evolutions have prompted operational, phenomenological, and 
ontological shifts in communication processes. These shifts, we argue, trigger the need to 
regard human and machine roles in communication processes in a more egalitarian fashion. 
Integrating anthropocentric and technocentric perspectives on communication, we pro-
pose an agent-agnostic framework for human-machine communication. This framework 
rejects exclusive assignment of communicative roles (sender, message, channel, receiver) 
to traditionally held agents and instead focuses on evaluating agents according to their 
functions as a means for considering what roles are held in communication processes. As 
a first step in advancing this agent-agnostic perspective, this theoretical paper offers three 
potential criteria that both humans and machines could satisfy: agency, interactivity, and 
influence. Future research should extend our agent-agnostic framework to ensure that com-
munication theory will be prepared to deal with an ostensibly machine-inclusive future.
Keywords: meaning-making, communicative functions, machine agency,  
anthropocentrism, technocentrism
Introduction
Early computer-mediated communication experiences emerged as computers were linked 
together for technical purposes (data redundancy, security, and transfer, largely within 
research and government communities) and humans began to organize themselves around 
data networks and machine actors (Leiner et al., 1997). Despite these machine-machine 
transaction roots of contemporary communication, machines’ roles in communication 
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receiving of messages (Gunkel, 2012). In turn, early human-computer interaction studies 
took up the dynamics of software and hardware—from hypertext to peripherals—as effi-
cient tools for users’ activities (Myers, 1998). Despite the centrality of human goals and 
influences to human-computer interaction, technologists often consider humans only in 
terms of their actions (Kaptelinin, 2012). That is, users present “human problems,” both 
in reference to the problems that humans face and solve through technology (Blomqvist, 
2018, para. 3) and in reference to how humans create problems to which technology must 
be resilient (Kletz, 1982, p. 209). 
Arguably, one of the simplest but most foundational frameworks for understanding 
communication as a dyadic process is the transmission model of communication (Shan-
non & Weaver, 1949), in which sources create messages that are then encoded into sig-
nals sent over channels (through some degree of noise) then decoded for consumption 
by receivers. Taken in terms of this model, scholarship within communication disciplines 
often characterizes machines merely as channels, and scholarship within the technological 
disciplines tends to characterize humans merely as senders or receivers. The parceling out 
of human and machine roles across disciplines is part of each domain’s strength in building 
rich understandings of those roles. However, such parceling is also each domain’s weak-
ness in that disciplinary blinders prevent important integration of theoretical and empirical 
work given that the boundaries of what counts as “human” and “machine” are increasingly 
blurred. 
Although some contend the transmission model is obsolete (e.g., for rigidity and lin-
earity; Day, 2000), we argue that the model is a useful tool for approaching emerging soci-
otechnical phenomena. The model focuses on core communicative functions independent 
of agent type, and such independence is fundamental for initially catalyzing necessary inte-
gration between human-focused and technology-focused paradigms. The model can only 
be applied to that end, however, if it is engaged in a more egalitarian fashion. Following, 
this theoretical paper proposes a reframing of the transmission model (as a parsimonious 
starting point) that focuses on agent functions rather than on heuristic agent roles such that 
humans and machines should both be considered candidate-actors for all components of 
the model. Such an approach is vital to advancing human-machine communication (HMC) 
scholarship in that it promotes attention to the “missing mass” of HMC (see Latour, 1992, 
p. 227)—those unattended-to dynamics of the emerging, unintuitive, and surprising ways 
that humans and machines make meaning together. Without this very purposeful atten-
tion to agent function independent of traditional roles, we risk overlooking the humanistic 
function of machines and machinic functions of humans. 
Our proposition is simultaneously not-new (in that its assumptions are discretely pres-
ent in more than three decades of communication technology scholarship, outlined below) 
and new (in that they have not yet been integrated into an accepted paradigm for con-
ducting such scholarship). We first briefly characterize anthropocentric and technocentric 
communication paradigms, illuminate recent technological and social shifts that drive the 
need for an agent-agnostic lens in addressing HMC, describe our operationalization of an 
agent-agnostic approach as grounded in attention to agent functions, and then outline can-
didate functions for consideration in such an approach.
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Anthropocentric and Technocentric Views on Communication
The roles of humans and machines in communication processes are generally engaged via 
two paradigms. The first is anthropocentric: humans are supreme in relation to other things 
(including machines) and the world is interpreted principally according to human experi-
ence and values (Nass et al., 1995). The other is technocentric: technology’s inherent fea-
tures and capacities are fundamental enablers (Papert, 1987) and constrainers (Woolgar, 
1990) of human activity, and humans and environments orient around and adapt to them 
(Schmoldt, 1992). 
The anthropocentric position adopts a relatively narrow view of machines as tools 
in support of human-to-human interlocution (see Gunkel, 2012). Much of this engage-
ment stems (as Gunkel notes) from early references to “computer conferencing systems” 
defined as “any system that uses the computer to mediate communication among human 
beings” (Hiltz & Turroff, 1993, p. 30). In relation to the transmission model, that work often 
defaults to discrete human and machine roles in communication processes. Specifically, the 
sender and receiver are human (e.g., citizens), while the encoder, decoder, and channel are 
machinic (e.g., platforms for facilitating voter literacy). This exclusive role-ascription gen-
erates rich understandings of machines’ functional roles in communication, yet it limits the 
scope to machines’ instrumental interactivity—human use of technology toward some end 
(Lister et al., 2009). These works orient themselves toward the problematics and possibilities 
of technological mediation while missing machines’ functioning in other communicative 
roles. Here, attention is importantly paid to communication through machines (e.g., human 
behaviors, risks, and values associated with social networks; see Kapoor et al., 2018) holis-
tically at the discount of communication with machines.
The technocentric position is occupied, in turn, by scholars adopting similarly nar-
row views of machines as resources or tools in optimization of processes (Taylor & Todd, 
1995), generally without attention to the ways that machines are socially constructed in 
their use (Bijker et al., 1987). A machine is a designed artifact, system, or procedure that 
shapes human users’ experience and actions through the “unfolding” of possibilities (Tid-
well, 1999). Although technocentric work often does not formally take up the transmis-
sion model despite the framework’s origins in technical systems design (Shannon, 1948), 
similar-but-inverse defaulting to agent-specific roles in terms of that model can still be 
drawn from those works. Machines are designed and understood largely as senders/encod-
ers and receivers/decoders (e.g., generating or seeking information; Mardini et al., 2018) 
while humans (although indeed important to some processes) are nearly treated as noise 
or obstacles in computing tasks. Although humans are the progenitor for much machine 
activity, they are also the component of machine processes whose shortcomings must be 
muddled through (i.e., human-fault-tolerant design; De Santis et al., 2008). These works 
orient toward problematics and possibilities of technologies’ design and function as genera-
tors or recipients of information while missing considerations of the meaning thereof. Said 
another way, emphasis is precisely placed on communication dynamics among humans and 
machines but often at the discount of the import and experience of those messages.
Sprung from these semantically competing paradigms are rich bodies of work bounded 
by disciplinary assumptions and aims that, holistically, exist in tension. In relation to humans, 
machines are discussed both as empowering (Beer, 2009) and constraining (Gagliardone, 
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2016), controlled (Plotnick, 2017) and automated (Fortunati, 2017), generative (Hasinoff, 
2013) and destructive (Hakkarainen, 2012). Nonetheless, both paradigms are in some ways 
compatible. The nature of each agent class’s influence over the other, and their situation 
across time and space, such that integration based on agent roles or functions is appropriate 
(see Fortunati, 2014). It is, therefore, necessary for HMC scholars to address these tensions 
to keep pace with scholarly and practical shifts in how machines function, are experienced, 
and may integrate into contemporary society.
Drivers for an Agent-Agnostic Approach to Communication 
Both technological and social evolutions have prompted shifts in human and machine par-
ticipations in communication processes. These shifts drive a need to consider agents in 
a fashion more functionally egalitarian—one that considers how each agent category has 
sufficient “basic capabilities” to perform functions and so warrant equal consideration (Sen, 
1979, p. 218). Before exploring such an agent-agnostic approach to considering human- 
machine communication processes, however, it is useful to consider shifts in what may 
count as the relevant basic capabilities. 
Operational Shifts
Perhaps most intuitive are machines’ emergent functions in traditionally human com-
municative capacities: message sources, receivers, and feedback initiators. As informa-
tion sources, voice assistants like Siri generate and convey messages in fashions that elicit 
human responses more closely mirroring interpersonal human processes than utilitarian 
technology-use processes (e.g., differentiating among machine voices in performance eval-
uations; Nass & Steuer, 1993). As sources, machines such as social robots may be perceived 
as intentionally generating messages, and mental states are attributed to those machines if 
the vocal or visual cues are sufficiently close to humans’ (Banks, 2019). As message receiv-
ers, autonomous machines may function as sociable partners with epistemologies of their 
own (Breazeal, 2004) even if we cannot (yet) discern that form of cognition (cf. Bogost, 
2012) such that we may need to consider, for instance, whether and how humans should 
adjust language patterns in order to be understood by a chatbot. Machines also engage in 
feedback-initiator roles by anticipating human responses (Pantic et al., 2007) and adapt-
ing behaviors and responses to user inputs and contexts, as with domain-specific chatbot 
feedback (Shawar & Atwell, 2007) or semi-autonomous avatars’ rejection/correction of user 
requests (Banks, 2015). 
In turn, humans can function in traditionally machinic communicative roles: habitual 
message encoders/decoders or mediating channels. They may take up information gener-
ated by sociotechnical systems and encode responses that are not necessarily authentic or 
original information but are encoded according to norm or habit (e.g., responding to Face-
book posts through phatic “likes”; see Hayes et al., 2016). Humans also function as message 
channels or repositories, carrying or retaining information for the purpose of delivering it 
to another recipient (Cowan, 1988) as when committing a license plate number to mem-
ory in order to tell a police officer. In that way, organic bodies are multimodal themselves, 
with visual and aural channels (i.e., gesture and voice; Mehrabian, 1972). Even further, the 
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body may function as an interface between the world and the brain, conveying sensory 
information across the Cartesian divide (Biocca, 1997). Humans also function as decoders 
of information; accessing, filtering, and breaking down information into usable pieces, as 
when deciphering news content on social media to determine which represent authentic or 
fake news (De Keersmaecker & Roets, 2017).
Ultimately, machines perform traditional human communication functions and 
humans perform traditional machinic functions. This requires recharacterization of both as 
variably intelligent, interactive agents (Chesebro & Bonsall, 1989) and as variably facilitative 
instruments. 
Phenomenological Shifts
The way that humans and machines are experienced by others has also shifted. Machines 
and the information they convey may be experienced as human(like), which affects percep-
tions of how interactions with them should proceed (de Graaf et al., 2016). This machine 
anthropomorphism—a perceiving as or imbuing with humanness(likeness)—emerges as 
humans apprehend and process social cues (Epley et al., 2007) and then engage in increas-
ingly social reactions. Cueing may be visual (e.g., inviting buttons to facilitate collabora-
tion), aural (e.g., mobile assistant voices that extend offers to help), kinetic (e.g., animated 
emoji movements such as a wave gesture or confetti projection), proxemic (e.g., spatial 
avatar behaviors like following or clustering), and/or chronemic (e.g., chatbot response lag 
times). This signaling facilitates experiences of machines as human(like), such that users 
develop relationships with them (Banks, 2015; de Graaf et al., 2016) or engage content rep-
resenting actual and non-actual phenomena as actually real (Nowak, 2003). In tandem with 
anthropomorphism, this sense of realness may rely on perceptions of agency, toward the 
application of human metaphors to understand machine functioning (e.g., “an electronic 
brain”; Bolter, 1984, p. 40). 
In turn, humans are also experienced to some extent as machinic. The human-as-
machine metaphor emerged by some accounts through media representations of troped, 
uncanny characters (androids, autonomous dolls; see Neisser, 1966). In line with modern-
ist perspectives on human behavior as rooted in observable, measurable, and predictable 
behaviors (Gergen, 1991), we have come to liken human thought and action to computer 
programming and machine action (see Newell & Simon, 1972) such that lay understand-
ings of behaviors rely on references to processing, interfacing, or even being cogs in the 
system (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Humans subjectively and actually draw on social 
infrastructures (e.g., network structures; Rainie & Wellman, 2012) to conduct information 
exchanges subject to specific protocols (e.g., conversations according to social norms; Jack-
son, 1965) via algorithms or programs (e.g., schemata or scripts; Axelrod, 1973), evidently 
toward the presentation and application of that information (i.e., stimulation of meaning 
in the other’s mind; McCroskey, 1992). Mechanization of domestic spaces sees technology’s 
active (albeit often opaque) shaping of humans’ leisure time and private spaces (Fortunati, 
2006), and technology and humanity are thought to mutually and cooperatively evolve (i.e., 
as a collective and connective intelligence; Longo, 2003). These characterizations, impor-
tantly, reveal that (independent of actual integrations, syntheses, or overlaps), people expe-
rience humans and machines in non-exclusive ways.
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Such phenomenological shifts suggest a need to de-privilege instrumentalist views on 
technologies (e.g., Heidegger, 1977). Positions that frame machines as mere tools limit the 
evaluation of their functionality to their human-intended purposes (rather than actual or 
potential behaviors). Instead, machines must be regarded as part of (and not apart from) 
the social structure of everyday human life with the ability to steer human behaviors and 
influence interaction outcomes (Latour, 1994). Hence, the role of machines in interac-
tions with humans, and in society as a whole, is not restricted to the machine’s mech-
anisms, physical and technical properties, or actual abilities (de Graaf, 2016). Rather, 
machines are also materially embedded and participate in meaning-making processes; 
from self-driving cars choosing quickest or most scenic routes to the construction of 
music consumption experiences sans material artifacts (Puntoni, 2018). Notably, our use 
of “meaning-making” here does not assume that machines can or must encode or decode 
information in the same fashion as do humans (cf. Bogost, 2012). Rather, we contend 
that the attention to meaning-making as a fundamental communication process is like-
wise to be accounted for agnostically: agents make meaning as a function of their intrin-
sic natures such that the process, product, or effects of machine-made meaning may be 
different from but not lesser than human-made meaning. In the same turn, it may not 
necessarily be that they are different, as both artificial and natural intelligence may draw 
from frames, scripts, schemas, routines, and maps (see Tenkasi & Boland, 1993). We take 
up meaning-making as a system’s response (behavioral, computational, or otherwise) to 
an environmental signal from which information is extracted and during which value is 
assigned (Neuman, 2006). In all, these meaning-making processes contribute to the shape 
of society, as social structures in turn influence the shape of humans and machines (see 
MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). We come to know occupants of each category through our 
experience of the other—so much so that even the boundaries of agent ontologies may 
not be as solid as they once were. 
Ontological Shifts
Finally, in tandem with operational and phenomenological shifts, ontological shifts can be 
observed. While operational shifts account for how agents work and phenomenological 
shifts are a matter of how agent classes are experienced, ontological shifts are a more objec-
tive consideration of what each class is and whether they are actually separate. The ontolog-
ical categories of “human” and “machine” have long been and are still converging through 
proximations in appearance, roles, and some forms of intelligence (cf. Biocca, 1997) and 
through functional interdependence (cf. Marx, 1887). Here, we’ll define a human, liberally, 
as an entity with personhood via functional and moral qualities of a unified, conscious 
member of the species Homo sapiens (Taylor, 1985). In turn, a machine is an “an assembly 
of parts that transmit and modify forces, motion, and energy one to another in a prede-
termined manner” (Harada, 2001, p. 456) where forces and motion include the internal 
workings of physical systems (see Seltzer, 2014) and energy includes information (Khurmi 
& Gupta, 2005).
Machines with increasingly humanlike social cues encourage people to engage in social 
interaction and “push our Darwinian buttons” with their displayed behaviors that humans 
associate with sentience, intentions, and emotions (Turkle, 2010, p. 3). For instance, although 
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Twitter bots were originally designed for the retweeting of existing content, programming 
advances have brought forth bots that populate profiles, emulate humans’ chronemic post-
ing signatures, comment on others’ posts, identify influencers and seek to gather followers, 
and clone some human(like) behaviors (Ferrara et al., 2016). This causes machines to onto-
logically fluctuate between something animate (adhering to human-category frameworks 
for sociability) and something inanimate (adhering to machine-category rigidity; de Graaf, 
2016; de Graaf et al., 2016) such that they may actually constitute a new category of agent 
altogether (Kahn et al., 2011). 
In parallel, humans may be categorized in some contexts as more machinic than social, 
very literally functioning as machines: “device[s] with a large number of internal . . . states” 
(Pentland & Liu, 1999, p. 229)—and as biological machines with a talent for semantics over 
syntax (Searle, 1990). Human behavior relies, to an extent, on (semi-)invariant rules and 
algorithms for how language, reasoning, and behaviors in relation to these states (e.g., such 
as encoding and decoding of symbols and reliance on cognitive shortcuts; Simon, 1990), 
such that human behavior can be computationally modeled and predicted (Subrahmanian 
& Kumar, 2017). Specific to communication behaviors, human-authored digital messages 
are both produced and consumed as entertainment—as informational or experiential 
assets—rather than necessarily according to socioemotional drives, as with the commodifi-
cation of personal information inherent to dating apps (Hobbs et al., 2017). 
There is rising fuzziness between human and machine categories and advances in 
cyborg potentials both in very literal and material integrations (e.g., mechanical limbs, bio-
mimetic technology; Barfield & Williams, 2017) and in looser configurations (e.g., a person 
wearing a watch or using a keyboard; see Gunkel, 2000). Following, there are less-concrete 
distinctions among modes of (non-)aliveness compared to our traditional understandings 
of those states (Jipson & Gelman, 2007). For instance, biohybrid robots combine organic 
components (like cultured muscle tissues) with machine components (like gels, electrodes, 
and metal frameworks) so that electrical stimulation allows the robot to perform human-
like behaviors like joint movement (see Morimoto, Onoe, & Takeuchi, 2018). Hence, when 
a biohybrid robot moves a hand or a finger, is that agent somehow alive? The aggregation 
of human and machine traits, components, or actions can result in an “overuse” of human 
categories for machines and associated application of group norms (Nass & Moon, 2000, 
p. 82). As ontological distinctions fade (Guzman, 2016a, 2018), some call for recognizing 
new ontologies for sophisticated sociable machines (Kahn et al., 2011) and recognizing 
entities beyond the “outdated category” of human (i.e., acknowledging the posthuman or 
transhuman; Wentzer & Mattingly, 2018, p. 144). Rather than arguing for more ontological 
categories in addressing communication dynamics, we suggest instead a reframing: shift 
away from agent categories to instead attend to the functions enacted.
Toward Human-Machine Equity in the Transmission Model
Considering those operational, phenomenological, and ontological shifts in humans’ and 
machines’ roles in communication processes, the transmission model requires re-examina-
tion. Recall that the model refers to the cumulative structure of a message source (or sender) 
encoding (translating meaning indicators) a message (some information) over a chan-
nel (some medium) which is then decoded (otherwise translated) for interpretation by a 
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target (or receiver), generally with some accounting for noise (signal disturbance). Although 
humans and machines are typically assigned to particular roles, we argue that humans and 
machines are potentially equivalent actors in communication processes. Following, we work 
here toward an egalitarian reframing of HMC processes (moving away from default roles and 
toward considering basic capabilities) and suggest directions for inquiry through this lens. 
Human-Machine Communication as Agent-Agnostic  
Transmission
Given that both humans and machines have been shown to function as actors across all 
stages of the transmission model of communication, we advance a decades-old, cross- 
disciplinary sentiment (that isolating agent types is epistemologically problematic; e.g., 
Giuseppe & Galimberti, 1998) by proposing a reframing of the transmission model that 
accounts for ways that both humans and machines can function as both functional and 
social actors according to the same criteria. We draw here on the notion of HMC as the 
“creation of meaning among humans and machines” (Guzman, 2018, p. 1), in which one 
or more agents relay data among others and in which meaning is encoded and decoded 
according to the native modes of each agent. This definition subsumes characterizations 
from technocentric perspectives privileging the agency of machines in social interactions 
as well as those from anthropocentric perspectives privileging humans as relevant agents. 
HMC is regarded as an umbrella concept acknowledging varied actors according to var-
ied functions (Guzman, 2016b) toward more inclusive and more flexible consideration of 
humans-machine sense-making.
We advocate, as a starting point, an approach that (1) considers each agent’s functions in 
the process (with attention to functions that may not be directly observable) and (2) draws 
on literatures pertaining to those functions (independent of enacting agent) to consider 
how meaning may emerge through antecedents, processes, and effects of that function. This 
agnosticism must be engaged through a lens akin to Dennett’s physical stance (1989) in 
which we would consider HMC according to our knowledge of the manifest properties of 
agents (and not what they are meant to do or what they may be said to intend). Although 
the physical stance is seldom engaged due to its complexity (e.g., delivering a physical 
account of the exact material processes and states that lead a chatbot to produce a response 
would be multiplex; Stich, 1981, see also Krassmann et al., 2019 for an example of one 
layer of such processes) and we may only engage it imperfectly, the attempt to question and 
discover agent functions is necessary and core to the application of functions as criteria in 
transmission processes. That is, to be agnostic toward agent class is to be diligent in reject-
ing its assumptions and attending to functions. For instance, in considering a question of 
how Internet-connected devices (e.g., a smart toothbrush; van der Zeeuw et al., 2019) might 
function in humans’ self-concepts, we might consider a “traditional” transmission-model 
mapping: a human user (Source) uses a device (let us continue with a smart toothbrush, a 
Channel) and in so doing performs certain behaviors (brush strokes, Encoded as data, from 
discrete movements); the behavioral information or lack thereof (here, Messages sent per 
brushstroke performed) are aggregated (Decoded and perhaps transformed to another data 
type) and re-presented by a Receiving application (i.e., one that might store and analyze that 
data) to deliver Feedback to the user. 
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Acknowledging that this is a simplification of such a process, if we decenter the human 
from that situation and consider the ways that other entities may function in a sender role, 
a host of other possibilities arise relative to other visit actors (device, application, motor) 
and (sub)components not readily observable (e.g., software, information packets, router). 
In tandem, removing assumptions about what actor fits what model block, the multiplex 
mapping of transmissions might instead consider how that machine manifests relationships 
with tangible and intangible objects in its orbit. For instance, we may also come to con-
sider that the device (Source) transmits experience-generated information (Message) with 
its software (Receiver) that prompts delivery of a reminder “beep” (Feedback). That beep is 
not merely a feature, it is a self-referencing message with potential meaning, generated by 
the software (Sender) via the toothbrush (Channel) to the constellated human (Receiver). 
Notably, this is but one potential interrogation of the candidate model, where each of 
the possible processes embedded may to some extent be relevant to a particular course 
of research. We argue, however, that unless the model is explored in this agent-agnostic 
fashion, we are unlikely to recognize and understand the missing mass within human/
machine interlocution. That is, we will be limited in considering (a) the ways that machines 
negotiate, push back on, and shape interactions and (b) the ways humans are script-driven 
and mediating. When we miss this mass, we may fail to acknowledge machine agency and 
human proceduralism. 
The hunt for missing mass in this fashion is not incommensurable with existing 
anthropo- or techno-centric perspectives—indeed it depends on them. Each domain 
trends toward specific functional features. Human-focused domains feature strong theo-
ries associated with agency, meaning-making, phenomenology, and behavioral outcomes. 
Technology-focused domains, on the other hand, feature strong theories of affording and 
constraining action, system and information dynamics, and concrete cause/effect protocols. 
Each body of literature may be most productively engaged when it is considered according 
to processes described that may apply to human or machine agents—but first, those com-
mon functions must be identified.
Functions as Criteria for Transmission Model Consideration
We have argued that an agent-agnostic transmission model rests on considering the com-
mon functioning or abilities of humans and machines that permit them to occupy each 
position in the model. From the practical and definitional ground articulated, we propose 
there are at least three classes of common functions that should be considered in determin-
ing whether an agent is acting in a particular communicative capacity: agency, interactivity, 
and influence. These are the basic capabilities that, when held, may be adequate to qualify 
an agent as occupying a particular role. This is not to say that agents will necessarily and 
equivalently occupy all positions. Rather, these functional criteria are a ground for con-
sidering whether they may occupy a given position. We also do not go so far as to outline 
kinds or degrees of these criteria for particular roles in the model. Instead, our aim here is to 
initially set forth the possible shared capabilities (rather than distinct human and machine 
capabilities; Kiousis, 2002) as a springboard for future theorizing that not only accounts 
for machines’ current functional capabilities but is also resilient to considerations for their 
expected and imagined future capabilities.
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The ground function of agency (including autonomy and potential intentionality) is 
defined as the capacity to make a difference through action (Cooren, 2004; Latour, 2014). 
Note that agency as a specific capacity to matter is distinct from our use of the term “agent” 
which more generally denotes actors that cause or initiate some event. Broadly, agency has 
been exclusively reserved for the living (Giddens, 1984), as we readily associate life and 
intentionality as preconditions for authentic action. Yet, a vast body of research acknowl-
edges the interventions of nonhumans in our everyday life: a speed bump makes you slow 
down (Latour, 1994); a memo informs employees of new policy (Cooren, 2004); a ther-
mometer co-shapes our experience of health and disease (Verbeek, 2005). Indeed, some 
social theory defines agency as “socio-culturally mediated capacity to act” (Ahern, 2001, 
p. 110). That definition deliberately embraces the inclusivity of machines, spirits, signs, and 
collective entities, and recognizes the cultural relativity of the notion of social action by all 
kinds of agents in certain contexts. It may be intuitive to recognize agency in embodied 
social computational systems (e.g., personified smartphones, [semi-]autonomous cars, and 
robotic objects capable of sociable interactions) as they elicit a unique, affect-charged sense 
of active agency experienced as similar to that of living entities (Young et al., 2011). It may 
be less obvious, though, that even non-embodied systems have inherent agency, as inter-
faces, algorithms, and network switches engage in material and semiotic ways of mattering 
in the course of meaning-making processes.
The operational shifts outlined note that both humans and machines can take on 
the role of the communicator: sending and receiving messages. Within communication 
sequences, agency can be understood as a potential standing-in of one actor for another 
when the other has lost its own ability to act or exert influence (as when a human cannot 
instantaneously travel long distances, a cadre of computers stands in for that limitation; 
Latour, 2014). This alternating of classical human and machine roles may be understood as 
a “dance of agency” (Pickering, 1995, p. 116). Examinations of agency in an agent-agnostic 
approach to HMC would attend, then, to the capacity for or enactment of instrumental 
force. That is, the ways that both humans and/or machines enact message production and 
reception (e.g., initiation of social and news messages; Neff & Nagy, 2016), effectively con-
vey information (e.g., channel functions in relation to inherent affordances for social cues; 
Aldunate & González-Ibáñez, 2017), and through action contribute to meaning-making 
(e.g., influencing formation of social judgments; Nowak, 2004). In tandem, acknowledging 
the agency of nonhumans by no means diminishes human agency. It merely makes fair con-
sideration of the ways that humans and nonhumans shape each other as they cooperatively 
make meaning (Williams & Edge, 1996).
The second common property (derived, in part, from the first) is potential for interac-
tivity, or the variable process of serial information exchange in which each transmission is 
contingent upon the prior, creating a binding social force (see Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997). 
This potential relies on each agent’s capability to encode/decode sign systems, such as those 
present in material exchanges and semiotic exchanges. Extending that conceptualization to 
material exchanges, objects engage in interaction with humans when a video game controller 
decodes a button-press as an input and may deliver haptic feedback as an output (Roth et 
al., 2018). Notably, that exemplar may be interpreted as reactivity rather than interactivity 
(the button is pushed and action occurs). However, that is an anthropocentric interpretation 
of interactivity requiring human-native self-referencing (which may or may not emerge in 
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machines in the future). From the common-function’ approach proposed here, the delivery 
of haptic feedback is considered a meaningful machine-native message in the same way that 
a human (if pushed) might shout “ouch” in return. Emphasizing semiotic exchanges, both 
humans and neural networks are interpreting meaning when they absorb images to create 
new graphics (Kowatari et al., 2009). Future research into this shared property may consider 
exchange structures (e.g., turn-taking and conversation dominance) and the dynamics of 
CMC-based human/machine collaboration (e.g., action coordination and problem-solving).
Finally, humans and machines share (as a product of the first and second properties), 
the potential to influence one another: to realize a potential to functionally matter to and 
manifest effects on the other. Scholarship investigating this shared property may attend to the 
ways that agents are capable of social and material impact. Certainly, people can influence 
machines, for instance through physical manipulations, design and programming, modding, 
and providing raw material for machine learning. Just the same, machines can influence 
humans. Machines induce emotional responses: humans experience increased physiological 
arousal when a robotic toy is being tortured (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., 2013) and act 
spitefully after feeling betrayed by a computer (Ferdig, & Mishra, 2004). How a system com-
municates with its users indirectly affects one’s engagement with the machine, including trust 
and blame for (in)action (e.g., Lyons & Havig, 2014). These cognitive and affective responses 
by human users to machines demonstrate perceptions of accountability for machine influ-
ence. Moreover, researchers have started to debate machine’s perceived worthiness of moral 
care and consideration—regardless of whether that is technically feasible or even desirable 
(Gunkel, 2017)—which indicates reciprocal effects caused by that influence. 
Conclusion
Considering the evolution of operational, ontological, and phenomenological shifts in 
humans’ and machines’ roles in media communication, we advocate shifting to an agent- 
agnostic transmission model of communication. By endorsing a decades-old critique artic-
ulating a problematic isolating of agent types and normative roles (e.g., Giuseppe & Gal-
iberti, 1998), we stress that humans and machines have the potential to be theoretically 
and operationally equivalent agents in communication processes as both social and func-
tional actors according to the same criteria of agency, interactivity, and influence. Draw-
ing on the HMC paradigm (principally, that meaning-making is a joint activity among 
human and machine agents), anthropocentric and technocentric perspectives are acknowl-
edged as specific permutations of how humans and machines engage each other in the 
loop of transmission communication, but not the only permutations. Rather, humans and 
machines are potentially equivalent interlocutors with potentially equivalent psychological, 
social, and moral consequences. We see this proposal as a first step in advancing agent- 
agnostic perspectives in HMC. Future scholarship is encouraged to explore the ways that 
our propositions may (and may not) extend to more complex models of communication 
(e.g., transactional, interactive, and constructionist models), and investigate the dynamics 
and contexts by which human and machinic agents may (and may not) occupy positions 
in those models. Such examinations will help to ensure that communication theory keeps 
pace with communication technology itself lest the discipline be poorly prepared (Guzman, 
2016a) and unable to deal with an ostensibly machine-inclusive future.
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